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INTRODUCTION
Does the First Amendment to the US Constitution protect a distinct notion of
“academic freedom”? Of late, courts and commentators have cast doubt on an
individual First Amendment right of academic freedom. When federal courts have
directed friendly attention to the matter, the result has been bromidic endorsement
with scant analytic heft. The goal of this Essay is to identify an organizing principle
for a constitutional jurisprudence of academic freedom. For unlike Holmes’s “law of
the churn,”1 an independent constitutional doctrine of academic freedom is
plausible. It could find inspiration in recent jurisprudence of Judge Frank
Easterbrook, who has penned four opinions touching on the scope of academic
freedom in the university setting.2
At first blush, these cases seem unlikely tributaries to follow to academic
freedom’s reinvigoration. Unlike other Seventh Circuit case law on academic
speech,3 Easterbrook’s opinions leverage academic freedom against individual
rights claimants. It is the state‐run educational institution that benefits from a
gloss of academic freedom to sanction speakers based on their speech.4 The
opinions’ claims about academic freedom, moreover, are not framed in
constitutional terms. Nevertheless, the cases provide a basis for an imaginative
reformulation of academic freedom as a constitutional concept despite, or even
because of, their counterintuitive results. They invite a strategy of judicial
protection of academic freedom by ensuring that legal or governmental action
neither displaces, nor excessively burdens, the professoriat’s free exercise of
professional judgment.5 The resulting constitutional norm of academic freedom
would be an exercise in Burkean minimalism—aspiring to preserve a professional
† Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 474–75 1897 .
2 See Hosty v Carter, 412 F3d 731 7th Cir 2005 en banc ; Feldman v Ho, 171 F3d 494 7th
Cir 1999 “Feldman II” ; Webb v Board of Trustees of Ball State University, 167 F3d 1146 7th
Cir 1999 ; Feldman v Bahn, 12 F3d 730 7th Cir 1993 “Feldman I” .
3 See, for example, Clark v Holmes, 474 F2d 928, 931 7th Cir 1972 limiting the scope of
“academic freedom” because of the “special characteristics of the environment,” including the
existence of a “captive audience” ”.
4 See, for example, Feldman I, 12 F3d at 732–33 “Every university evaluates and acts on the basis
of speech by members of the faculty.” .
5 Like the argument for free exercise of religion, the argument here is that academic freedom
demands both negative liberties and accommodations.
1
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culture our society values and protects through constitutional precommitment.6
This understanding of academic freedom’s constitutional status in both private and
public institutions would push judges to distinguish between professional and
bureaucratic judgments and allow speech to be sanctioned based only on the
former.7 Judges thus would trim their sails when navigating claims challenging the
exercise of professional academic judgment, but closely scrutinize nonprofessional
efforts to regulate academic speech.
The core idea is hardly novel. And in elaborating Judge Easterbrook’s
arguments into constitutional fabric, I make no claim that he himself would endorse
my aggressive constitutional reading. Judge Easterbrook might treat the cases
discussed below as exercises in statutory interpretation informed by social policy.
But the fragmentary and hesitant state of the jurisprudence suggests that this is a
propitious moment for reclaiming constitutional ground for academic freedom.
Sustenance must be drawn wherever it may be found.
Unsolved doctrinal questions abound even after the analysis. Most obviously, I
have nothing here to say about which institutions should receive constitutional
solicitude seminaries? think tanks? , although my insistence on professional
boundaries may have some resolving power.8 Nor do I have anything to say here
about what general normative theory should shape the First Amendment. It is
enough that many such theories see value in preserving a tradition of academic
production independent of statist control. My modest aspiration is to supply an
easily formulated organizing principle for the doctrine that may then be challenged,
disregarded, or refined.
I. DOCTRINAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A.
Casual perusal of the Federal Reporters today suggests academic freedom is a
legal concept in critical condition. Its constitutional status is under siege in the
Supreme Court. It is frankly repudiated by leading circuit court judges. Jurists scoff
at the prospect of indolent academics—glutted at faculty lunches on oysters,
aphorisms, and amour propre—being granted constitutional entitlements greater
than the riffraff. Commentators, even sympathetic ones, proffer lukewarm defenses.
First, the Supreme Court’s regard of academic freedom is thin. In 1952, the
Supreme Court rejected a freestanding academic freedom right, and wholly
6 See Cass R. Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds: Why the Founding Document Doesn’t Mean
Princeton 2009
“Burkean minimalists believe that constitutional
principles must be built incrementally and by analogy, and with close reference to long‐standing
practices.” .
7 See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L J 151, 172 1996 .
8 See note 101.

What It Meant Before 36
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subsumed state‐employed academics into the law of government employment.9
Under then‐prevailing law, state employment was a privilege.10 Professors had “no
right to work for the State” but remained “at liberty to retain their beliefs and
associations and go elsewhere.”11 Subsequent cases, however, endorsed academics’
freestanding constitutional interest in scholarly production.12 Unlashed from
government‐employment doctrine, constitutional treatment of academics’ speech
seemed fated to trace a distinctive arc.
It was not to be. No cases build substantially on the early precedent to explain
why or how academic speech is distinct.13 In 2006, moreover, the Supreme Court, in

Garcetti v Ceballos,14 narrowed First Amendment protection of government
employees’ speech rights by holding that speech made pursuant to “official duties”
warranted no First Amendment shelter.15 Garcetti cast a shadow on state‐employed
academics’ status. As Justice David Souter cautioned in his Garcetti dissent,
academic production at state universities is necessarily “pursuant to . . . official
duties.”16 Excluding such speech from the First Amendment’s compass would, by
extension, strip constitutional protection from most of state academics’ speech. This
would have the peculiar consequence of creating a wide asymmetry between the
state‐employed professoriat and its private sector counterparts, who benefit from
generally applicable First Amendment protection against state intrusions on their
speech.17 Even though the Garcetti majority pretermitted consideration of academic
speech, the circuit courts have divided on whether its logic extends to academic
speech.18

9 See Adler v Board of Education of City of New York, 342 US 485, 492 1952 .
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See, for example, Keyishian v Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385
US 589, 603 1967 ; Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 250 1957 ; id at 261–64 Frankfurter
concurring .
13 See University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 493 US 182, 198–99 1990
rejecting First
Amendment–based privilege for peer‐review materials but declining to define the “precise contours” of
an academic‐freedom right to be unencumbered by government attempts to influence speech ;
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v Knight, 465 US 271, 287 1984 rejecting a First
Amendment right of participation in academic governance .
14 547 US 410 2006 .
15 Id at 423.
16 Id at 438–39 Souter dissenting .
17 Note the complexity of the analogy: Garcetti concerns the disciplinary authority of a state
employee’s supervisors. The analog in the private sector is the university’s administration. The
asymmetry emerges because in the state university context, an institution’s administration is an
unmediated conduit for influence by legislatures, while in a private university, a professor would have a
constitutional defense against like legislative interference.
18 Compare Renken v Gregory, 541 F3d 769, 774 7th Cir 2008 ; Hong v Grant, 516
F Supp 2d 1158, 1167–68 CD Cal 2007 with Lee v York County School Division, 484 F3d 687, 694–95
n 11 4th Cir 2007 . See also Gorum v Sessoms, 561 F3d 179, 185–86 3d Cir 2009 applying Garcetti to
governance and administrative speech .
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Supreme Court repudiation of academic freedom, moreover, would not entail
high stare decisis costs. Foundational opinions concerning academic freedom from
the 1960s can be explained by other doctrines: Keyishian v Board of Regents of the

University of the State of New York19 hinges on vagueness.20 Sweezy v New
Hampshire21 turns on overbreadth.22 As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
summarized matters, “The Supreme Court has never set aside a state or federal
regulation on the basis that it infringed a First Amendment right to academic
freedom.”23
In two circuit courts, moreover, constitutional protection of academic freedom
is already on the ropes. In the Fourth Circuit, a pre‐Garcetti en banc court rejected
academic freedom “not . . . as a professional norm, but . . . as a constitutional right”
that is “enjoyed by only a limited class of citizens.”24 Hence, that court suggested,
members of a state university’s faculty have no right to determine the contents of
their teaching or their scholarship.25 Concurring separately, Judge J. Michael Luttig
emphasized the public’s right, correlative with its financial subvention of academic
salaries, to direct the content and ends of academic research.26 Notably, in
repudiating the constitutional valorization of academic freedom, the Fourth Circuit
invoked and relied upon the existence of a robust “professional norm” of academic
freedom.27 By this reasoning, existence of a separate professional norm defended by
the American Association of University Professors is a substitute for legal
protection.28 In the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, the doctrine has not gone so far. In
litigation challenging a ban on travel to Cuba, Judge Laurence Silberman echoed
Judge Luttig’s concurrence, proposing that a state legislature can control the content
of classroom teaching and doubting whether “‘academic freedom’ is a constitutional
right at all.”29 While Judge Silberman was writing a concurrence, his stature and

19 385 US 589 1967 .
20 See id at 599–600.
21 354 US 234 1957 .
22 See id at 246–47. Other cases are also amenable to recategorization under other First
Amendment rules. See Whitehill v Elkins, 389 US 54, 59–62 1967 holding that a statute that
required state employees, including university professors, to take an oath of loyalty was overly broad
because it proscribed mere “alteration” of the government and not simply violent overthrow . Shelton
v Tucker, 364 US 479, 485–86 1960 noting that a teacher’s freedom of association can not be
limited by forced disclosure to the school board .
23 Urofsky v Gilmore, 216 F3d 401, 411–12 & n 13 4th Cir 2000 en banc .
24 Id at 411 & n 13.
25 Id at 414.
26 Id at 424 Luttig concurring .
27 Urofsky, 216 F3d at 410–11, citing J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the
First Amendment,” 99 Yale L J 251, 262–64, 273–79 1989 .
28 By extension, judicial solicitude for the First Amendment should be negatively correlated with
revenues of the ACLU.
29 Emergency Coalition to Defend Educational Travel v United States Department of the
Treasury, 545 F3d 4, 19–20 DC Cir 2008 Silberman concurring .
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influence as a jurist on the DC Circuit signals a reasonable possibility of further
doctrinal shifts in that important federal appeals court.30
There are further barriers to academic freedom’s legal endorsement. Problems of
academic freedom arise at a conflicted nexus of interlocking constitutional doctrines
and factual circumstances. This complexity raises the cost of crafting a coherent
doctrinal berth for academic freedom. In particular, four lines of constitutional
doctrine entangle and impinge upon a clear view of constitutional academic freedom.
First, as explored above, the new rule of Garcetti for government employee
speech puts into question the relationship between the general law of government
employment and the specific status of state‐employed academics. With conflicting
circuit precedent already coalescing, further litigation or certiorari consideration of the
issue seems likely.
Second, and relatedly, the Supreme Court increasingly accords “government
speech” its own distinctive treatment. Where government “effectively control s ”
the content of a third party’s speech, a majority of the Court in recent cases,31 over
narrow concurrences and vigorous dissents,32 has treated that speech as
“government speech” insulated from First Amendment challenge.33 It remains
unclear what must be the case for speech to be properly attributed to the
government such that the speaker is treated as a proxy meriting no constitutional
entitlement of her own.34 Judge Luttig, at a minimum, would treat academic
production as in effect government speech. But state subsidization of speech alone
does not strip a speaker of constitutional protection.35 Some speakers are
constitutionally entitled to state funding.36 The net result of the “recently minted”37
government speech doctrine is thus a web of increasing analytic complexity that the
Court has yet to resolve fully.
Third, some speech that might be encompassed by academic freedom arises in
contexts that might also be characterized as designated public forums. For example,
faculty involvement with student groups may implicate public forum issues.38 Or
scholars might claim a right to involvement in governance issues by asserting that
30 But see id at 14–15 Edwards concurring defending academic freedom .
31 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v Summum, 129 S Ct 1125, 1134 2009 ; Johanns v Livestock
Marketing Association, 544 US 550, 560 2005 .
32 See, for example, Summum, 129 S Ct at 1139 Stevens concurring ; Livestock Marketing, 544
US at 571 Souter dissenting .
33 See, for example, Summum, 129 S Ct at 1134; Livestock Marketing, 544 US at 560.
34 See, for example, Livestock Marketing, 544 US at 567–68 Thomas concurring .
35 See, for example, FCC v League of Women Voters of California, 468 US 364, 398–99 1984
holding that radio stations cannot be prohibited from editorializing because they receive federal funds ;
Post, 106 Yale L J at 154 cited in note 7 .
36 See, for example, Rosenberger v Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515
US 819, 828–37 1995 holding that denial of funding to a student magazine violated the First
Amendment .
37 Summum, 129 S Ct at 1139 Stevens concurring .
38 See Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 267–68 n 5 1981 .
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some faculty‐administration colloquia are public forums.39 The case law to date has
generated no organizing rule for the interaction of these concepts.
Finally, the academic environment does not involve mere binary oppositions
between constitutional rightsholders and the state. Rather, it is characterized by
polycentric conflicts between multiple rightsholders—students as well as
professors—and differently situated components of the state. Professors speak in
multiple, overlapping contexts ranging from the classroom to the faculty workshop
to the increasingly common blog. Students currently can raise constitutional
objections to decisions about speech in or around classrooms40—including the
assignment of required texts41—or the allocation of intramural speech
opportunities.42 Decisions about how university dollars are used to fund third‐party
speech may also be vulnerable to constitutional challenge by fee‐paying students.43
The state, too, is polyglot. When a state university’s faculty votes to deny a colleague
tenure, they speak in a professional timbre. When a state legislature, perhaps seizing
on Judge Luttig’s suggestion, directs scientists to find evidence of global warming,
other considerations are in play. Diverse disputes may demand fine judgments to
balance the interests of students, teachers, and institutions.
These doctrinal complexities are compounded by a reticulated and constantly
morphing factual backdrop. The role of higher education in American society has
changed dramatically in the last century. In the first seven decades of the twentieth
century, for example, the size of higher education and its impact on the population
changed dramatically. Whereas 5 percent of the cohort born in the first decade of
the twentieth century graduated from a college, the respective proportion of the
cohort born in the late 1960s and early 1970s was almost seven times as large.44
“Variety and competition,” most significantly between public and private
institutions, has also “characterized the U.S. system of higher education almost since
its origin.”45 The balance of public and private provision remains in flux. The
fraction of students in public institutions rather than private colleges rose from 22
39 See Knight, 465 US at 281.
40 Compare Widmar, 454 US at 267–68 n 5 noting that a university campus operates as a public
forum for student speech with Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v Fox, 492
US 469, 475–81 1989 upholding a restriction on nonstudent commercial speech on campus .
41 Consider Yacovelli v Moeser, 324 F Supp 2d 760, 764 MD NC 2004 rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a book assignment in a mandatory freshman class .
42 See Rosenberger, 515 US at 828–37. These are not best characterized as “academic freedom” cases,
but rather “student speech” cases under a separate line of First Amendment doctrine.
43 See Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v Southworth, 529
US 217, 233 2000 .
44 Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, The Race between Education and Technology 248–49
Belknap 2008 . After 1980, the growth rate of the proportion of a cohort entering college slowed, and
the proportion of freshmen graduating grew. Andrew Hacker, Can We Make America Smarter?, NY Rev
Books 37, 37 Apr 30, 2009 .
45 Goldin and Katz, Education and Technology at 257 cited in note 44 .
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to 70 percent between 1900 and 1975.46 In public institutions, different
mechanisms of legislative control over a university’s administration can be
imagined. A legal conception of academic freedom must therefore register both the
commonalities and differences between public and private institutions.47 It must
explain how the generally applicable speech rights of state employees and private
actors are either ratcheted down or amplified when it comes to academics.48
Protection of faculty against public institutions’ decisions about research and
teaching might also create an asymmetry between faculty and teachers at private
institutions, who must secure their independence without the aid of constitutional
law.
Faced with this fluid complexity, a reasonable judge might note the paucity of
publicized incidents of academic freedom’s infringement.49 She might be reassured
by Robert Post and Matthew Finkin’s recent defense of the professional norm of
academic freedom.50 She might further be comforted by Stanley Fish’s brisk judgment
that any “effort to transform the professional concerns of scholars and teachers into
constitutional rights” is “doomed.”51 She might draw the conclusion that special
constitutional solicitude for academic speech is unwarranted given the sedulous
defense of the professional norm by civil society. Discrete silence may seem the least
costly modality of judicial valor.
II. EASTERBROOK ON THE ACADEMY
B.
Judge Easterbrook’s decisions provide a lens for reconsideration of the
constitutional salience of academic freedom. Their author, a founding figure in the
law and economics movement, is not typically associated with expansive views of
most individual constitutional liberties.52 In his academic writings, Judge
46 Id at 266. Under these circumstances, it is hardly clear what effect constitutional deregulation or
its converse has on the private sector. See David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and
“Institutional” Academic Freedom under the First Amendment, 53 L & Contemp Probs 227, 268–
71 1990 .
47 For example, in a public university, faculty members are state actors when they hire and fire
colleagues. They are constitutional rightsholders when hired or fired.
48 For this reason, it is simply not enough to say, as Stanley Fish has, that “‘constitutional academic
freedom’ is a non‐topic.” Stanley Fish, Academic Freedom: How Odd Is That?, 88 Tex L
Rev 171, 183 2009 . At the very least, there is a need to decide whether—and to explain why—
generally applicable rules that protect state employees and private citizens in their professional
capacities extend to scholars.
49 Of course, this may be the result of a presumed backstop of legal protection; that is, the
professional standard only survives thanks to the shadow of legal liability. Please do not change
50 See Matthew W. Finkin and Robert C. Post, For the Common Good: Principles of American
Academic Freedom 8–9 Yale 2009 .
51 Fish, 88 Tex L Rev at 183 cited in note 48 .
52 But see American Booksellers Association, Inc v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323, 328 7th Cir 1985
invalidating and denouncing an Indianapolis antipornography statute as “thought control” .
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Easterbrook has conceptualized judicial review as constrained by the need to
persuade other actors Congress, the Presidency, the people of its net benefits. He
proposed that the judicial role in constitutional law be circumscribed to “only the
portion of the text or rule in the Constitution sufficiently complete and general to
count as law.”53 This is hardly an ample imagining of the judicial role in protecting
individual liberties.54
Judge Easterbrook’s analysis of academic freedom draws the sting from one
complaint about its constitutionalization: umbrage sparked by professors’
“audacity” in asserting “a constitutional right enjoyed by only a limited class of
citizens.”55 In four cases, Judge Easterbrook has identified and endorsed the
protection of academic freedom as an aim of constitutional significance. But that end
is accomplished not simply by expansion of individual claims against state‐run
institutions. Rather, the court of appeals, with Easterbrook writing, has rejected
individual claims by professors and students in order to preserve academic
freedom. On this view, academic freedom is no unmitigated boon for slack‐jawed
intellectual sybarites. Bivalent, it licenses both judicial hedging of individual rights
and forms a basis for individual constitutional rights claims. Elaboration of Judge
Easterbrook’s approach to academic freedom hence provides a useful avenue for
reconsideration, and eventual doctrinal reconceptualization, of academic freedom.
Three of the four cases touching on academic freedom decided by Judge
Easterbrook center on professors contesting adverse employment decisions. A
fourth concerns students’ speech rights. The first two cases, decided in
December 1993 and March 1999, arose from a suit filed by former mathematics
professor Marcus Feldman, who upon his dismissal from Southern Illinois
University for making an unfounded charge of plagiarism sued “everyone in sight.”56
In the first round of litigation, Judge Easterbrook rejected as inapposite the then‐
applicable balancing test for constitutional protection of government employee
speech, which hinged on whether the speech was “of public interest.”57
Investigations of plagiarism accusations such as Feldman’s involved “no categorical
answers,” explained Judge Easterbrook.58 Rather, the appropriateness of
disciplinary action rested on “a process of investigation and deliberation” as to
whether the accuser acted with due care and whether the accused was indeed

53 Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U Chi L Rev 349, 372–73, 376 1992 .
54 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 S Ct Rev 85, 117
doubting that legislatures will procedurally underprotect entitlements .
55 Urofsky v Gilmore, 216 F3d 401, 411 & n 13, 412 4th Cir 2000 en banc .
56 Feldman v Bahn, 12 F3d 730, 731 7th Cir 1993
“Feldman I” . See also Feldman v
Ho, 171 F3d 494, 495 7th Cir 1999 “Feldman II” .
57 Feldman I, 12 F3d at 733.
58 Id.
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culpable.59 In the university context, the constitutional law of government employee
speech furnished an insufficiently granular tool. As a result of the complexity of the
situation, Judge Easterbrook held that qualified immunity for Feldman’s First
Amendment claims was appropriately awarded.60
In the second iteration of Feldman’s suit, arising after a jury trial based on a
recast theory of liability, Judge Easterbrook threw out a jury award against the chair
of the mathematics department of Southern Illinois University in his individual
capacity.61 The First Amendment, reasoned Judge Easterbrook, “does not commit to
decision by a jury every speech‐related dispute in a university . If it did, that would
be the end of a university’s ability to choose its faculty.”62 Chastising the district
court for inattention to his December 1993 opinion, Judge Easterbrook held that the
university’s denial of continued employment to Feldman was “inevitably concerned
with speech and so central to a university’s mission that the university’s role as
employer dominates.”63 In both iterations of Feldman’s case before the Seventh
Circuit, the distinctive environment of the university shaped the otherwise‐
applicable law of government employee speech to the detriment of the plaintiff.
The third case involved another disgruntled faculty litigant, Gary Webb, whose
complaint “ laid blame on almost everyone but himself” for the “collapse in
cooperation and decorum” within Ball State’s criminology department.64 Webb and
coplaintiffs sued on the basis of perceived adverse actions arising out of a complex
and protracted intramural dispute.65 Again, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion, this time
denying the interlocutory relief of reinstatement to plaintiff Webb,66 stressed the
university’s interest “as employer” in ensuring that its faculty “devote their energies
to promoting goals such as research and teaching” unencumbered by collateral
internecine disputes.67 The analysis in Webb’s case was framed as an application of
the “government interest” prong of the generally applicable balancing test then used
in government employee speech cases.68 Despite coloring within the lines set by
doctrine, the opinion again articulates a conception of the university’s role and
responsibilities that is distinct from other government employment.

59 Id.
60 Id at 733–34.
61 See Feldman II, 171 F3d at 498.
62 Id at 496.
63 Id at 497–98. One reading of the case would stress that the same result would arise in other
contexts, and that the quoted language is mere verbiage without consequence. Even if that is so, the
verbiage provides a useful theoretical basis for constitutionalizing academic freedom.
64 Webb v Board of Trustees of Ball State University, 167 F3d 1146, 1147–48 7th Cir 1999 .
65 See id at 1148–49.
66 Id at 1150.
67 Id.
68 Webb, 167 F3d at 1150, citing Connick v Myers, 461 US 138, 146 1983 .
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The fourth case involved students’ First Amendment interest in publishing a
university newspaper without prior scrutiny by the university’s administration.69
The central issue presented by the case—which involved a university
administrator’s effort to prescreen the contents of a campus newspaper—was
doctrinal: should Hazelwood School District v Kuhlmeier,70 a Supreme Court
decision narrowly reading high schoolers’ speech rights,71 be extended to the
university context? The result of expanding Hazelwood and cabining speech rights
was the grant of qualified immunity to the defendants.72 As in Webb and both
Feldman cases, Judge Easterbrook’s analysis again sprang from a distinctive
conception of the university’s autonomy in conducting its overall mission of
“teaching and scholarship.”73
A common thread links these opinions: there is a consistent conception of the
social function of the university, whether public or private, and the respect owed by
federal courts to professional judgments. This conception merits exploration and
elaboration as a basis for a robust, independent constitutional doctrine of academic
freedom.
C.
The conception of constitutional academic freedom animating Judge
Easterbrook’s opinions might be reformulated as follows: in academic institutions, a
collegial body of professionals both generates and evaluates new knowledge in the
form of speech under conditions of shared professional rules and norms. The
institutional environment sustains continued production of new knowledge in
accord with standards and metrics of quality derived from shared academic
traditions. Constitutional adjudication of individual rights claims arising from
speech in an academic institution must be sensitive to the effects of government
action, whether legislative or judicial in origin, upon the academy’s discursive
ecosystem. It must protect the ongoing collective application of professional norms
within the institutional setting of the university regardless of whether it is private or
public. On occasion this means curtailment of individual professors’ constitutional
rights. Other times it means their expansive vindication.
To elaborate, the university is characterized by a peculiar, perhaps unique,
conjunction of two conditions. First, academics not only “speak and write for a living
and are eager to protect both public and private interests in freedom to stake out
controversial positions,” but also “evaluate speech for a living” by, among other
69 Hosty v Carter, 412 F3d 731, 732–33 7th Cir 2005 en banc .
70 484 US 260 1988 .
71 Id at 266–67.
72 Hosty, 412 F3d at 739 granting qualified immunity because “the implementation of Hazelwood
means that both legal and factual uncertainties dog the litigation” AP .
73 Id at 736.
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things, grading students, editing journals, and rejecting poor‐quality scholarly
papers.74 While most institutional extrusions of government “could not penalize any
citizen for misunderstanding the views of Karl Marx or misrepresenting the political
philosophy of James Madison, . . . a Department of Political Science can and should
show such a person the door.”75 A university also acts on the basis of speech’s
content when it polices academic speech for plagiarism76 and when it regulates the
quality of teaching.77 As a result, viewpoint discrimination is both endemic and
unavoidable in a university setting.
Second, power to sanction or reward on the basis of speech is vested solely in
those with academic credentials or those acting on their behalf in either a public or
private setting.78 They exercise that authority only on the basis of academic norms
and criteria. No other government employees are vested with equivalent power to
sanction or reward on the basis of academic speech. To the contrary, Judge
Easterbrook explains, it is up to the faculty alone, not nonprofessional legislators or
juries, to ascertain whether speech satisfies an “institution’s standards of quality”79
and to exercise the privilege of expertise.80 Democratic credentials are a positive
disqualification when it comes to judging academic speech.
Academic freedom here demands both the protection of individual speech from
exogenous that is, nonprofessional censoring, and the insulation of a “university’s
academic independence” in the exercise of judgment respecting faculty speech from
extraneous nonprofessional influences.81 In this regard, “the faculty’s professional
interests . . . cannot be separated from those of the institution.”82 The dynamics of
academic production differ from the operation of most other institutions of
government, where responsiveness to a democratic principal typically is seen as a
good.
But is there, in fact, a body of professional norms consistently applied across
disciplines that characterizes the American academy and distinguishes it from other
state‐run institutions? Previous commentators have adduced the history of
professional norms of academic freedom as indirect evidence of professional
74 Feldman I, 12 F3d at 732.
75 Id at 732–33.
76 See Pugel v Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 378 F3d 659, 668 7th Cir 2004
holding that the First Amendment was not violated by a university’s punishment of a graduate
student for falsifying results .
77 See Trejo v Shoben, 319 F3d 878, 884–85 7th Cir 2003 .
78 University administrators have broad license in executing others’ professional decisions. They
also enforce certain nonprofessional norms against which academic freedom provides no defense for
example, discrimination law .
79 Feldman II, 171 F3d at 496.
80 See Post, 106 Yale L J at 171–72 cited in note 7 .
81 Feldman II, 171 F3d at 495–96.
82 NLRB v Yeshiva University, 444 US 672, 688 1980 .
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standards.83 A recent empirical study of peer review and evaluative academic panels
by Michèle Lamont confirms the existence of “shared rules of deliberation that
facilitate agreement” across disciplines in academic judgments.84 Belief in peer
review’s effective regulatory function, according to Lamont, is “crucial” to
institutional coherence, because without it the majority of applicants rejected would
“lose faith.”85 That is, the persistence of the university as a going intellectual concern
rests partially on sustained and committed application of professional standards.
This view of the academy harmonizes with existing Supreme Court case law.
The latter stresses the “background and tradition of thought and experiment that is
at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”86 Justice Felix
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Sweezy emphasized the “grave harm” of
“government intrusion into the intellectual life of a university,” and insisted that
“ p olitical power,” as distinct from professional judgment, must abstain from
intrusion.87 The Court recognizes that an academic judgment may “by its nature be
more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions” raised by a
government employment decision.88 In a recent case about administrative
regulation of student civil society, it endorsed a vision of the university as a place of
“intellectual awakening” at the cross‐currents of plural speech and normative
traditions.89 Like Judge Easterbrook, Supreme Court precedent further recognizes
that judicial interference as much as legislative tampering imperils the continued
application of academic norms.90
Protection of academic professional norms from external influences has three
doctrinal implications, two affirmative and the other negative in nature. The twin
affirmative doctrinal manifestations of constitutional academic freedom “are both
designed to facilitate the professional self‐regulation of the professoriat.”91
First, the conception of academic freedom here advanced rejects the position
that an individualized right to academic freedom is never necessary. If university
83 See, for example, Finkin and Post, For the Common Good at 11–27 cited in note 50 ; Judith
Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic
Freedom and Governance, 97 Georgetown L J 945, 953–67 2009 .
84 Michèle Lamont, How Professors Think: Inside the Curious World of Academic Judgment 6
Harvard 2009 .
85 Id at 52. See also Areen, 97 Georgetown L J at 960 cited in note 83 .
86 Rosenberger v Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 US 819, 835 1995 .
87 Sweezy, 354 US at 261–62 Frankfurter concurring . See also Regents of the University of
California v Bakke, 438 US 265, 312 1978 Powell concurring ; Board of Curators of the University
of Missouri v Horowitz, 435 US 78, 91 1978 .
88 Horowitz, 435 US at 89–90.
89 Rosenberger, 515 US at 836. In Rosenberger, the Court invalidated an administrative judgment
in favor of free inquiry by students. While the plaintiff was a student, not a professor, the principle of
truth‐seeking academic discourse is the same.
90 See, for example, Regents of the University of Michigan v Ewing, 474 US 214, 227 1985
Powell concurring .
91 Robert Post, The Structure of Academic Freedom, in Beshara Doumani, ed, Academic Freedom
After September 11 61, 64 Zone Books 2006 .
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professors were no different from the mass of government employees, a state could
apply Garcetti’s logic to define the “official duties” of, say, state university history
faculty to teaching that the Confederacy was not to blame for the inception of the
Civil War, or to prohibit scholarship endorsing US interventions into Afghanistan or
Iraq. Or a state could prohibit faculty from teaching and research leading to the
conclusion that Islam is consistent with democracy and toleration.92 Application of
Garcetti in this manner would undermine the professional discourse that lies at the
heart of the academic enterprise. Thus, a positive doctrinal manifestation of
constitutional protection of academic norms is the privately or publicly employed
“scholar’s constitutional right to express a point of view,” which cannot be
impinged by the state through direct regulation.93 More complex questions are
implicated by selective government funding, now practiced by the National Institute
of Justice, the National Institutes of Health, and other government entities.
Constraints imposed as conditions of government funding are regulated by the
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.94 While the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine remains somewhat contested, it can be read to allow the government to
direct that state funds be used to research, say, climate change, but not to dictate the
results of that research.95
No constitutional right of action would lie, by contrast, against a decision taken
on academic grounds by professional peers in either a private or public context. Nor
does exogenous government action that neither limits nor mandates academic
speech—for example the enforced presence of military recruiters on campus—
present a problem.96
Second, as a correlative to this individual right, the university, whether part of
the state or not, has wide institutional authority “to set a curriculum” as an element
of academic freedom.97 This part of academic freedom encompasses what the
Supreme Court has described as “autonomous decisionmaking by the academy
itself.”98 Legislative efforts to direct the content of curriculum, on this account, are
impermissible. For example, while North Carolina legislators could assail the
92 Consider Yacovelli v Moeser, 324 F Supp 2d 760, 764 MD NC 2004 .
93 Webb, 167 F3d at 1149.
94 See, for example, Rumsfeld v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc, 547 US 47, 59–
60 2006 .
95 In another context in which professional role responsibilities have constitutional significance—
lawyering—the Court has limited the government’s ability to control the speech of government‐funded
counsel. See Legal Services Corporation v Velazquez, 531 US 533, 542–43 2001 .
96 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547 US at 60.
97 Webb, 167 F3d at 1149.
98 Ewing, 474 US at 226 n 12. Many scholarly treatments of academic freedom reduce academic
freedom to that which does not interfere with the administration’s managerial prerogatives. See
Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 Fordham L
Rev 33, 99 n 269 2008 collecting examples
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University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2003 for assigning the work of “self‐
proclaimed atheist” and “radical socialist” Barbara Ehrenreich, they could not have
converted their ire into legislated action.99 Michigan’s attempt to regulate speech at
its public universities raised similar concerns at the margins.100 Exercise of this
institutional authority to sanction or reward individual speech on professional
grounds, however, is not only legitimate but in practice central to the academic
enterprise.101
Third, academic freedom has a negative consequence. It secures the academy’s
insulation from exogenous pressures by cutting short the exercise of individual
rights that interfere with the operation of professional academic norms. That is,
while academic freedom yields additional constitutional protection, it also shaves
off legal protections for individuals at another margin when these protections
conflict with an institution’s effort to maintain shared scholarly norms. Judge
Easterbrook’s opinions in Webb and the two Feldman cases are illustrative of this
dynamic. This doctrinal modification may be justified on the assumption that the
academy attracts individualist mentalities so that the incidence of obduracy to the
point of incivility and litigiousness is above the mean. Sore losers in academic
tournaments or otherwise disgruntled professors might act as holdouts from the
collective enterprise of professional deliberation. Generally available litigation may
be a device to extract rents for example, further employment because litigation
erodes the common good of the deliberative culture.102 Given the steep costs of
employment‐related litigation to the deliberative professional culture of the
academy, Judge Easterbrook’s logic suggests, “the only way to preserve academic
freedom is to keep claims of academic error out of the legal maw.”103 Challenges to
decisions made by academic decisionmakers on the basis of academic standards,
therefore, are presumptively insulated from judicial review.104
This is not to say that any intrusion into the academic workspace displaces
professional norms and thereby violates constitutional academic freedom. As often
99 See Finkin and Post, For the Common Good at 2–3 cited in note 50 .
100 See Doe v University of Michigan, 721 F Supp 852, 854, 860–67 ED Mich 1989 invalidating
policy
101 This illuminates the case of pervasively religious educational institutions that do not follow
widely shared academic norms in hiring, tenure, and disciplinary decisions. Such institutions and their
employees do not benefit from academic freedom. Rather, they can claim separate freedoms under the
religion clauses of the First Amendment.
102 See Webb, 167 F3d at 1150 describing the costs of litigation upon the university and the
academy .
103 Feldman II, 171 F3d at 497.
104 There is a debate in the literature about what the result would be if a plaintiff alleges that her
peers’ academic grounds are a pretense. Should the faculty benefit from a presumption of good faith?
Compare Byrne, 99 Yale L J at 308 cited in note 27 yes , with Rabban, 53 L & Contemp Probs
at 283–86 cited in note 46 no . If the doctrine’s aim is to insulate academic decisions, with the
principal marginal cost being imposed by the sheer fact of litigation, then a good faith standard seems
appropriate.
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is the case, what crosses the constitutional line depends on case‐specific empirical
assessments of what constitutes an excessive burden. The Supreme Court can thus
conclude that discovery of peer review materials poses no threat105 without
repudiating the general importance of academic professional norms. The same
analysis could be extended to the disputed issue of institutional review boards
IRBs , which precertify human‐subject research. Dubbed by Philip Hamburger the
“New Censorship,” as they “single out one conception of knowledge for constraint,”
IRBs impose costly frictions on research.106 “Their validity, however, should turn not
on their formal resemblance to prior restraints, but on whether they are consistent
with, or instead usurp, academic decisionmaking.”
Formulating academic freedom in this manner resolves tensions with other
constitutional doctrines. Garcetti applies only with regard to the judgments of other
faculty the analog to supervisors , and not the state generally. Since academic
speech is the product of independent professional norms, it cannot be attributed to
the state and hence treated as “government speech.” Public forum doctrine is
unnecessary for the protection of academic freedoms. And multipolar disputes
should be resolved, following Judge Easterbrook, with an eye to the lodestar of
preserving the academy’s autonomy.
This conception of academic freedom repudiates the transubstantive ambitions
of First Amendment law in favor of constitutional protection of distinctive
professional norms.107 It is not unique in this regard. In another context, the Court
held that lawyers funded by the state may not be constrained by law from making
the full range of arguments demanded by professional norms and standards.108
Citing earlier precedent, the Court explained that “canons of professional
responsibility” bind lawyers in ways inconsistent with viewpoint‐based limitations
on representation.109 As Robert Post has underscored, professional norms have
proved salient to constitutional analysis in many First Amendment issues.110 Judge
Easterbrook’s analysis suggests they should also be dispositive in the academic
context.
III. OPEN QUESTIONS
The goal of insulating academic professional norms from legal interference
provides a touchstone for judicial consideration of academic freedom. But it does
not answer all questions or guarantee the persistence of academic production.
105
106
107
1998
108
109
110

See, for example, University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 493 US 182, 198–99 1990 .
Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 S Ct Rev 271, 309.
Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 Harv L Rev 84, 117
noting the “empirical reality of institutional specification” .
See Velazquez, 531 US at 540–45.
Id at 542, quoting Polk County v Dodson, 454 US 312, 321–322 1981 .
See Post, 106 Yale L J at 172 cited in note 7 .
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At the threshold, the project of constitutional academic freedom assumes that
the First Amendment supplies reasons to care about preserving an academic
discourse. One reason may be to preserve the academy’s “marketplace of ideas.” As
Frederick Schauer has observed, this deliberative, truth‐oriented ideal may lie at the
heart of the First Amendment, but the conditions necessary for its successful
operation simply are absent for most of society.111 The academy does manifest the
necessary properties to permit a functioning “marketplace” of the kind valued by
the First Amendment.112 Alternatively, if academic freedom is a tradition that is
worthy of constitutional shelter under a Burkean approach to constitutional
entitlements, then what other professional norms deserve protection? Under
current doctrine, lawyers and some journalists are protected but doctors are
not.113 Hard questions may be posed by journalists employed by the military or
religious groups used to supply social services. No clear selection principle has yet
emerged for the application of Burkean solicitude to ongoing, private traditions.
Further, there are endogenous risks to academic freedom. There is no
guarantee that the university will persevere in its extant form through the
immediate future. It can be abandoned from within. Mark Taylor, chair of Columbia
University’s religion department, argues that universities’ “emphasis on narrow
scholarship” within disciplinary bounds is already anachronistic, and should be
abandoned in favor of career‐oriented, problem‐solving models deemphasizing
individual scholarship.114 Although this change would merely compound a shift
begun more than a century ago,115 Taylor’s argument might imply that the
discursive freedom until now necessary for the academic project to thrive is no
longer necessary. Or the academy may be corroded from the outside: Harvard’s
current president, Drew Gilpin Faust, expresses concern that the recent recession
has imposed “unanticipated financial constraints” on universities, with the
“worrisome impact” of “reinforc ing America’s deep‐seated notion that a college
degree serves largely instrumental purposes.”116 If Taylor proves influential or if
111 Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 26–27, 33 Cambridge 1982 .
112 Other commentators suggest that academic freedom may channel important political dissent.
See Jennifer Elrod, Critical Inquiry: A Tool for Protecting the Dissident Professor’s Academic
Freedom, 96 Cal L Rev 1669, 1687–89 2008 . But the aim of professional standards is not to challenge
orthodoxies any more than it is to reinforce them. The truth‐seeking effects of professional norms will
too often be orthogonal to any political program to found academic freedom’s constitutional status on
such a basis.
113 Compare FCC v League of Women Voters of California, 468 US 364, 398–99 1984 ; Legal
Services Corporation v Velazquez, 531 US 533, 540–45 2001 with Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 196–
99 1991 .
114 Mark C. Taylor, End the University as We Know It, NY Times A23 Apr 27, 2009 .
115 Under attack from utilitarian critics, nineteenth‐century higher education in England
increasingly prioritized the hard sciences and the liberal arts over the fine arts and traditionally prized
disciplines such as theology. See Elizabeth Anderson, John Stuart Mill: Democracy as Sentimental
Education, in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ed, Philosophers on Education: Historical
Perspectives 333, 335–36 Routledge 1998 .
116 Drew Gilpin Faust, The University’s Crisis of Purpose, NY Times BR19 Sept 6, 2009 .
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Faust’s fears come to fruition, the ensuing instrumental version of higher education
may have scant use for the ideals and norms protected in cases such as Webb and
Feldman. Law can do little to staunch inexorable historical change. More likely it will
timidly fall into line.
CONCLUSION
These are parlous times for doctrinal academic freedom. Reading Judge
Easterbrook’s jurisprudence on the operation of higher education, one finds little
enthusiasm for professorial litigants. But one does find a robust understanding of
the academy’s social function. That understanding can be leveraged,
notwithstanding Judge Easterbrook’s skepticism of individual rights, to underwrite
a reinvigoration of constitutional academic protection. Such a project could well fail.
It hinges on whether Judge Easterbrook’s understanding of the university’s social
function resonates with other federal judges. It also depends on the uncertain
trajectory of higher education in the twenty‐first century. If it founders, though, that
failure cannot be attributed to an absence of insight or intellectual vigor in the
generative Easterbrook opinions that set forth new grounds for thinking about
constitutional academic freedom.
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